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Introduction 
General relativity is the theory of space, time, and the gravitational 
phenomenon, which is generated by both matter and energy. The most important 
Albert Einstein's work has been tested and confirmed so far. The most recent test 
was the detection of gravitational waves by the international collaboration LIGO 
(The Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory).2 During the 20th 
and 21th centuries, general relativity has obtained successful results and reliability. 
But should every prediction in general relativity be considered reliable? Alongside 
general relativity's predictions such as gravitational waves, black holes, and the 
hypothetical big bang,3 the Einsteinian theory provides special space-time curves 																																																								1	Time machines are predictions of Einstein's theory of general relativity and provide a	
myriad of unsolved paradoxes. Convincing and general arguments against time machines 
and their paradoxes are missing in physics and philosophy so far. In this article, a 
philosophical argument against time machines is given. When thought of as a process, 
individuation refuses the idea of time machines, in particular travels into the past. With 
the aid of Nietzsche-Heraclitus' philosophy of becoming and Simondon's notion of 
process of individuation, I propose that time machines are modern fables, created by the 
man of ressentiment. In the amor fati formula of Nietzsche, I suggest the antipode to time 
machines.         
This study was financed in part by the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de 
Nível Superior—Brazil (CAPES)—Finance Code 001. 2 	Abbott, B. P. et al. (LIGO Scientific Collaboration and Virgo Collaboration). 
“Observation of gravitational waves from a binary black hole merger.” Physical Review 
Letters 116: 061102, 2016. 
3 The big bang is not the unique response regarding the origin of the universe because 
bouncing cosmologies—models without the big bang—are possible in science today. 
See, for example, Brandenberger, R., and Peter, P. “Bouncing cosmologies: progress and 
problems.”  Foundations of Physics, 47 (6): 797-850, 2017, Novello, M. and Perez 
Bergliaffa S. E. “Bouncing cosmologies.” Physics Reports 463 (4): 127-213, 2008, and 
Neves, J. “O eterno retorno hoje.” Cadernos Nietzsche 32: 283-296, 2013, and “Bouncing 
cosmology inspired by regular black holes.” General Relativity and Gravitation 49 (9): 124, 
2017.  
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called closed time-like curves (CTCs). Time-like curves are natural paths of 
observers, i.e., humans and every object with mass travel in space-time through 
time-like curves. And, in particular, closed time-like curves are curves or paths 
where, according to general relativity, observers would travel into the past or into 
the future. Then, the question in general relativity is not merely time dilation or 
different elapsed times generated by relative motion of observers as described by 
special relativity. The main question in general relativity is geometric, that is to 
say, different space-times (also known as geometries in Einstein's theory of 
gravitation) may provide CTCs and—at least mathematically—a direct form to 
travel in time. Then, among researches in general relativity, CTCs mean “time 
machines.”   
      Time machines are amongst the most interesting and attractive subjects 
(especially for the general public) in theoretical physics. In general relativity, the 
possibility of returning into the past brings paradoxes like the problem, for an 
observer, of traveling into the past to kill, for example, his own grandfather. There 
exist some physical and philosophical arguments that try to avoid such paradoxes 
like the grandfather paradox. For example, Hawking 4  with his chronology 
protection conjecture tries to avoid the paradoxes and causality violations that 
involve time machines. Hawking uses, among his arguments in order to reject 
CTCs, a confirmation according to which if time machines were possible, we 
would see “hordes of tourists from the future” (610). Moreover, Hawking 
indicates physical results, which come from both quantum theory and general 
relativity, in order to rule out travels into the past.   
      In the general relativity realm, the very first solution of Einstein's gravitational 
field equations that predicts CTCs was the van Stockum solution in the thirties.5 
However, the existence of such curves in the van Stockum space-time was only 
																																																								
4 Hawking, S. W. “Chronology protection conjecture.” Physical Review D 46 (2): 603-611, 
1992. 
5 van Stockum, W. J. “The gravitational field of a distribution of particles rotating about 
an axis of symmetry.” Proceedings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh 57: 135-154, 1938. A review 
on CTCs in general relativity is found in Lobo, F. S. “Closed timelike curves and causality 
violation.” In Vincent R. Frignanni (Ed.), Classical and quantum gravity: theory, analysis and 
applications. New York: Nova Science Publisher, 2012, and Earman, J., Smeenk, C., and 
Wüthrich, C. “Do the laws of physics forbid the operation of time machines?” Synthese 
169 (1): 91-124, 2009. The latter discusses some time machine paradoxes and questions 
on the possibility of generating CTCs in accordance with laws of physics. 
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pointed out by Tipler years later.6 The impressive Gödel7 universe as well as the 
two non-intersecting cosmic strings of Gott8 present CTCs as well. Therefore, as 
we can see, Einstein's theory of gravity provides naturally such curves, and a 
strong, definitive, and general argument that rules out time machines and their 
paradoxes is missing in physics so far.9  
      In this paper, I present a philosophical argument in order to deny the physical 
reality of CTCs or time machines. According to the argument, time machines are 
forbidden because individuation is an uninterrupted process. That is, following 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Heraclitus' notion of becoming, and Gilbert Simondon's 
concept of process of individuation, it is shown that individuation—when not 
considered as a process—leads to the belief in isolated entities or milieu-
independent entities, and, consequently, provides the belief in time machines. 
Accordingly, human individuals considered as isolated entities will be fictional 
because humans are generated by processes of individuation and are immersed in 
collective contexts. It is worth to emphasize that the argumentation in this article 
is philosophical one. In order to deny time machines (focusing on travels into the 
past), I will not use physical and mathematical concepts. I will emphasize the 
concept of individuation instead of physical-mathematical concepts as indicated, 																																																								
6 Tipler, F. J. “Rotating cylinders and the possibility of global causality violation.” Physical 
Review D 9 (8): 2203-2206, 1974. 
7 Gödel, K. “An example of a new type of cosmological solutions of Einstein's field 
equations of gravitation.” Reviews of Modern Physics 21 (3): 447-450, 1949. 
8 Gott, J. R. “Closed timelike curves produced by pairs of moving cosmic strings: exact 
solutions.” Physical Review Letters 66 (9): 1126-1129, 1991. 
9  Physical arguments against time machines have been pointed out as well. In 
Introduction, we saw Hawking's argument. But, even in physics there are others. It is 
shown that Gott's time machine has non-physical origin or source in Deser, S., Jackiw, 
R., and 't Hooft, G. “Physical Cosmic Strings Do Not Generate Closed Timelike 
Curves.” Physical Review Letters 68: 267-269, 1992. On the other hand, in Pavan, A. B., 
Abdalla, E., Molina, C. “Stability, causality, and quasinormal modes of cosmic strings and 
cylinders.” Physical Review D 81 (4): 044003, 2010, the authors show that CTCs are 
unstable and unable to promote travels in time. However, those studies are not general, 
they were made from both a specific background, or class of space-times, and a particular 
quantum field, the scalar field in Pavan et al. Even Hawking's criticism depends on either 
the non-acceptance of the weak energy condition violation or the validity of large back-
reaction effects, which would prevent formation of CTCs. But today in physics, 
violations in energy conditions are more acceptable since the detection of cosmic 
acceleration, promoted by dark energy, and back-reaction effects are speculations from 
an incomplete quantum theory of gravity. Thus, a general and convincing physical 
argument against CTCs is absent in physics today.  
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for example, in Earman et al. As we will see, the novel argument presented in this 
work is based on the concept of process of individuation. At the end of this 
article, it is suggested an origin for the time machines fable: the modern 
ressentiment. And in the amor fati formula of Nietzsche we find the antipode to the 
modern ressentiment and time machines.        
    
The Problem of Individuation   
      I construct an argument against time machines from the philosophical 
concept of individuation, or generation of an individual. For various thinkers in 
the history of philosophy, individuation has an origin: a supposed principle of 
individuation (principium individuationis). The principle of individuation was a very 
useful concept adopted by philosophers. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, for 
example, says that the principle of individuation is “what makes something 
individual as opposed to universal” (737). In this sense, a specific man is different 
from the universal man because of the principle of individuation. Then, according 
to this perspective, our world is made up of various entities, or individuals, for the 
principle of individuation is present.  
      In Schopenhauer's philosophy, the principle of individuation promotes the 
world as representation. As the thing-in-itself is the will, something beyond the 
principle of individuation,10 Schopenhauer claims that such a principle generates 
individuals from the will, or unity, which is the origin of the world, “the innermost 
essence, the kernel, of every particular thing and also of the whole.”11 Therefore, 
unity, or the will, presents itself as a myriad of objects, i.e., our physical world is 
the will by means of the principle of individuation. 
      In the same direction, for the young Nietzsche, the principle of individuation 
is identified to a drive (Trieb), which receives the name of the Greek God Apollo. 
But the origin of the world, such as in Schopenhauer's work, is attributed to unity, 
which in Nietzsche's initial philosophy is the Primordial Unity (Ur-Eine) (BT I). 
The mature Nietzsche rejected Schopenhauer's influence, and, from the maturity 
period, the philosopher created his own concepts, like will to power. Even the 
Primordial Unity was ruled out, because the world as wills to power is conceived 
of as plural.12  Above all, the metaphysical principle of individuation was the 																																																								
10 In The World as Will and Representation, the principle of individuation is equivalent to 
space and time: “I shall call time and space the principium individuationis, an expression 
borrowed from the old scholasticism (...)” (Second Book, 23). 
11 Ibid, Second Book, 21. 
12 See Müller-Lauter, W. “Nietzsche's Teaching of Will to Power,” translated by Drew E. 
Grin. Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 4/5: 37-101, 1993. 
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attempt of describing the multiplicity in terms of a unique origin, or a unique 
cause, for those important thinkers. Thus, individuation and its supposed cause, 
the principle of individuation, are ingredients in order to justify the physical world 
from a metaphysical origin. 
      Without metaphysical speculations, individuation may be seen as a natural 
process. Instead of a metaphysical principle, individuation may be conceived of as 
a process, described by physical and mathematical concepts, according to the 
French philosopher Gilbert Simondon. Thus, to think of Simondon's 
individuation means to realize a process with degrees: “I intend therefore to study 
the forms, modes and degrees of individuation in order to situate accurately the individual 
in the wider being (…),” said Simondon.13 According to Simondon, an individual 
is a process of individuation acting. An individual, in his perspective, is a 
metastable system that comes from another metastable system: a preindividual 
system. Both living beings and physical objects are systems with non-vanishing 
potential energy, are processes, i.e., are non-static beings:14  
 
The process of individuation must be considered primordial, for it is this process 
that at once brings the individual into being and determines all the distinguishing 
characteristics of its development, organization and modalities. Thus, the 
individual is to be understood as having a relative reality, occupying only a certain 
phase of the whole being in question — a phase that therefore carries the 
implication of a preceding preindividual state, and that, even after individuation, 
does not exist in isolation, since individuation does not exhaust in the single act 
of its appearance all the potentials embedded in the preindividual state. 
Individuation, moreover, not only brings the individual to light but also the 
individual-milieu dyad. 
 
For Simondon, the process of individuation, or individuation, does not generate 
an isolated being. The individual-milieu dyad also appears during the process. In 
Simondon, we find a description of the problem of individuation as uninterrupted 
process. Individuals are neither static beings nor isolated entities without any 
relation with the environment (milieu):  a full, complete, and isolated individual is 
something fictitious. In relation to living beings, the process of individuation acts 
continuously, individuating itself: “The living being resolves its problems not only 																																																								
13 See Simondon, G. The Genesis of the Individual, translated by Mark Cohen and Sanford 
Kwinter. In Crary, J. and Kwinter, S. (eds.). Incorporations (Zone 6). New York: Zone 
Books, 1992, p. 311.  
14 Ibid, p. 300. 
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by adapting itself which is to say, by modifying its relationship to its milieu 
(something a machine is equally able to do) — but by modifying itself through 
the invention of new internal structures (…).”15 Following Simondon, Weinbaum 
and Veitas16 proposed a new form to define and conceive of intelligence by means 
of the process of individuation. For those authors, intelligent agents emerge from 
a complex context and become intelligent from a process of self-organization and 
formation, where “individuation is a resolution of a problematic situation” (381). 
      In my point of view, Simondon's process of individuation carries concepts 
and similar interpretations to Heraclitus and Nietzsche's philosophy of becoming. 
Such as Heraclitus' world view (or at least the Platonic Heraclitus17), we can see 
the importance of becoming, or process, in Simondon's philosophy. Denying any 
eternal substance, Simondon says that “the opposition between being and 
becoming can only be valid within a certain doctrine that supposes that the very 
model of being is a substance.”18 Such as in Nietzsche's philosophy, we may find 
the question about “stability” of individuals. In the mature Nietzschean 
philosophy, individuals are transitory configurations of wills to power.19 
      In this article, the main argument in order to deny time machines—especially 
travels into the past—is found in an image from Heraclitus of Ephesus, and 
images, or metaphors, have been useful in science as well. In Thermodynamics, 
for example, the volume of a perfect gas may be thought of as a set of non-
interacting little balls. In general relativity, the space-time curvature may be 
suggested by a heavy body upon a trampoline, deforming its surface. In particular, 
a metaphor underlies hypothetical time travels: it is the metaphor of a time 
traveler as a “free particle,” i.e., a time traveler playing the role of a non-interacting 
particle. As we will see, an isolated individual, generated by a hypothetical 
principle of individuation or, equivalently, a complete process of individuation is 
the origin for such a metaphor. Then, the metaphorical ingredient is present to 
think of (or to construct) reality in the most abstract natural science as well.  
																																																								
15 Ibid, p. 305. 
16 Weinbaum, D. and Veitas, V. “Open ended intelligence: the individuation of intelligent 
agents.” Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Articial Intelligence 29 (2): 371-396, 2017. 
17 Cf. Kahn, C. H. The art and thought of Heraclitus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979. 
18  See Simondon, G. “The position of the problem of ontogenesis,” translated by 
Gregory Flanders. Parrhesia 7: 4-16, 2009, p. 6. 
19 See Müller-Lauter, W. “Nietzsche's Teaching of Will to Power,” translated by Drew E. 
Grin. Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 4/5: 37-101, 1993. 
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      Heraclitus, “the philosopher of becoming,” is supposed to say, according to 
Plato, “that all things are in motion and nothing at rest (...).”20 The philosopher 
of Ephesus compared all things “to the stream of a river” and said “that you 
cannot go into the same water twice.”21 Not only the river flows, but everything 
is in flux, even the observer who observes the flux: “In the same river, we both 
step and do not step, we are and we are not”.22 Thus Heraclitus denied stability 
for the entire world. For Nietzsche, above all, Heraclitus denied the concept of 
being as something static, considering it illusory and fictitious. The German 
philosopher and philologist, Nietzsche, was a hard critic of the philosophical 
language. Behind philosophical concepts, Nietzsche saw prejudgments and 
idiosyncrasies. Nietzsche, in the mature period of his work, criticized philosophy 
and its dogmas, philosophers and their bias and prejudgments. By means of a 
strong language criticism, the German philosopher attacked the foundations of 
philosophy and science. And the notions of both thing and the thing-in-itself are 
within his criticism. In a fragment of 1887, Nietzsche wrote (KSA 12:10[202]): 
 
The “thing-in-itself” absurd. If I think away all the relationships, all the 
“qualities”, all the “activities” of a thing, then the thing does not remain behind: 
because thingness was only a “fiction added” by us, out of the needs of logic, 
thus for the purpose of designation, communication (...). 
 
The German philosopher considered the concept of thing-in-itself absurd 
because every “thing,” as language construction, depends on humans, it is related 
to humans. Nietzsche also criticized the notion of thing in a passage in which 
mathematics and the classical logic, or the principle of identity, are attacked: 
 
The invention of the laws of numbers was made on the basis of the error, 
dominant even from the earliest times, that there are identical things (but in fact 
nothing is identical with anything else); at least that there are things (but there is 
no “thing”) (HH 19). 
 
According to Nietzschean philosophy, a specific “thing” is a human creation. 
More specifically, it is a creation from the human body—it depends on the body 																																																								
20 Cf. Cratylus, 402a, in Plato. The Dialogues of Plato, translated by B. Jowett. London: 
Oxford University Press, 1892.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Heraclitus of Ephesus, 49a, in Freeman, K. Ancilla to the pre-Socratic philosophers: a complete 
translation of the fragments in Diels. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948. 
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structure. Kant's forms of sensibility and the understanding, which are conditions 
to think of and to know an object, are transferred to the human body in 
Nietzsche's philosophy.23 For Nietzsche, a given thing is an interpretation of 
becoming. Nietzsche followed Heraclitus and adopted the same point of view of 
the Ephesus thinker. That is, Nietzsche's world view in his maturity is Heraclitean 
in some degree. The world is interpreted as becoming (Werden), i.e., the nature of the 
world is change, process, flux or wills to power struggling: “becoming, effecting, 
is only a result” of wills to power (KSA 13:14[79]). In another fragment, the 
philosopher wrote: “All that happens, all movement, all becoming as a 
determining of relations of degree and force, as a struggle (...)” (KSA 12:9[91]). 
That is, “This world is the will to power — and nothing besides!” (KSA 11:38[12]).24 
Therefore, Nietzsche assumes Heraclitus' river image or, at least, the Platonic 
interpretation of Heraclitus. In Ecce homo, the German philosopher wrote on his 
Dionysian philosophy and his affinity with Heraclitus' philosophy:25  
 
The affirmation of passing away and destruction that is crucial for a Dionysian 
philosophy, saying yes to opposition and war, becoming along with a radical 
rejection of the very concept of  “being” — all these are more closely related to 
me than anything else people have thought so far (EH  “The Birth of the 
Tragedy” 3). 
 
According to his Dionysian philosophy, a given “thing,” or individual, is 
conceived of as a “clipping” from becoming, and the concept of “being,” as 
something stable, is only a fiction that comes from a drive that refuses the total 
becoming. In Twilight of the idols he said: “(..) Heraclitus will always be right in 
thinking that being is an empty fiction” (TI “Reason in philosophy” 2). Therefore, 
in this perspective, a totally isolated object, or individual, such as a free particle 
(an extreme act of individuation in physics created in order to simplify 																																																								
23 Body in Nietzsche means mind, spirit as well: “Of all that is written I love only that 
which one writes with his blood. Write with blood, and you will experience that blood is 
spirit” (Z I “On Reading and Writing”). 
24 Cf. Müller-Lauter, W. “Nietzsche's Teaching of Will to Power,” translated by Drew E. 
Grin. Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 4/5: 37-101, 1993, and, for a physical point of view, 
Neves, J. “Cosmologia dionisíaca.” Cadernos Nietzsche 36 (1): 267-277, 2015, and 
“Nietzsche for physicists.” Philosophia Scientiæ 23 (1): 185-201, 2019. 
25 Nietzschean view on war was constructed from the Greek concept of agon. In an initial 
text, The Homer's contest of 1872, the young Nietzsche emphasizes the dispute as a 
Leitmotiv in the ancient Greek culture. 
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calculations because a free particle does not interact), and something stable like 
the Parmenidean “being” are only chimeras.  
      The river image, or metaphor, provides an argument against time machines. 
First of all, time machines, especially travels into the past, assume full processes 
of individuation because human travelers are conceived of as isolated, static 
beings, and detached “things” from becoming, from the universal flux, and from 
a milieu. Supposedly, the traveler through a CTC would return to another point 
over the river, interacting with another historical time and context, or another milieu 
as Simondon called. But in the river image, to abandon becoming and to travel 
into the past are impossible. The belief in some sort of complete individuation—
provided by an interpretation of individuation as non-process, supposedly 
generated by the principle of individuation—leads to the belief in humans as 
something detached from becoming, or from some sort of context.  The river 
picture, in turn, and essentially the becoming perspective reveal such a 
hypothetical travel as science fiction because the full individual—as a “free 
particle”26—and the Parmenidean concept of being are fable.  The individual is 
not an aeterna veritas (eternal truth), is not apart from the universal flux, and, 
according to Nietzsche, this is a common error in philosophy: 
 
All philosophers have the common failing of starting out from man as he is now 
and thinking they can reach their goal through an analysis of him. They 
involuntarily think of “man” as an aeterna veritas, as something that remains 
constant in the midst of all flux, as a sure measure of things (HH 2).  
 
      The pictorial argument presented in this article—the becoming point of 
view—does not deny time dilation (or different elapsed times) described by both 
special relativity and general relativity.27 Such as on the ordinary river, flux in 
Heraclitus' river is not invariant. In a real river, the fluid velocity depends on the 
position and depth. A mass or volume of water (an “individual” or “being” in this 
metaphor) will have different velocities if its position is close or not to the margin, 
or at a great depth. Different elapsed times given by Lorentz's transformations in 																																																								
26 This is another metaphor. A “real” traveler through a CTC would experience tidal 
forces during a hypothetical time travel. The term “free particle” here indicates only an 
isolated individual from any context. 
27 In special relativity, time dilation is given by the relative motion of observers. On the 
other hand, in general relativity, time dilation is given by the gravitational redshift, which 
is generated by variations in the gravitational field and provides the GPS (Global 
Positioning System) technology. 
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special relativity would be assured in Heraclitus' metaphor because the universal 
flux is not ever the same. But CTCs or travels into the past would be ruled out.      
      The dear reader could ask me about the possibility of traveling over an 
ordinary or real river. By using a boat, for example, a traveler could reach any 
point over a real river. However, in this example, the boat does not make part of 
the universal flux. In this argument, the boat is considered as something firm, as 
a stable being—something different from becoming. But Heraclitus taught us that 
“all things are in motion” (including that boat), or that all things flow, and thus 
spoke Zarathustra in a brilliant passage in which the Ephesus philosopher and his 
doctrine are indicated (Z III “On Old and New Tablets” 8):  
 
If timbers span the water, if footbridges and railings leap over the river, then 
surely the one who says “Everything is in flux” has no credibility. 
 
Instead, even the dummies contradict him. “What?” say the dummies, 
“everything is supposed to be in flux? But the timbers and the railings are over 
the river! 
 
Over the river everything is firm, all the values of things, the bridges, concepts, 
all 'good' and 'evil' — all of this is firm!” — 
 
But when the hard winter comes, the beast tamer of rivers, then even the wittiest 
learn to mistrust, and, sure enough, then not only the dummies say: “Should 
everything not — stand still?” 
 
“Basically everything stands still” — that is a real winter doctrine, a good thing 
for sterile times, a good comfort for hibernators and stove huggers. 
 
“Basically everything stands still” — but against this preaches the thaw wind! 
 
The thaw wind, a bull that is no plowing bull — a raging bull, a destroyer that 
breaks ice with its wrathful horns! But ice — breaks footbridges! 
 
Yes my brothers, is everything not now in flux? Have all railings and footbridges 
not fallen into the water? Who could still hang on to “good” and “evil”? 
 
“Woe to us! Hail to us! The thaw wind is blowing!” — Preach me this, oh my 
brothers, in all the streets!  
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Amor Fati Contra Time Machines 
      Considering modernity, Nietzsche's diagnosis is clear: the phenomenon of 
ressentiment (resentment) is present. Then, it is not difficult to identify the reason 
why modern man believes in time machines. Firstly, modernity emphasizes 
individuation, insofar as it created the image of citizens as social atoms. However, 
as we saw, such an image is not appropriate when we adopt the notion of process 
of individuation. Secondly, that man of ressentiment believes that it is possible to 
travel into the past not only in order to witness historical events but in order to 
correct them. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche describes that type of man, whose 
archetype is Socrates, who believes “that thought, as it follows the thread of 
causality, reaches down into the deepest abysses of being, and that it is capable, 
not simply of understanding existence, but even of correcting it” (BT 15). I argue 
that the time machine fable is, above all, created by ressentiment, i.e., the 
phenomenon of ressentiment is the origin for hypothetical travels into the past. 
Such a fable comes from the impossibility of accepting fate. On the other hand, 
it is by means of the amor fati formula that Nietzsche denies the modern ressentiment 
and (likely) would reject time machines:      
 
My formula for human greatness is amor fati: that you do not want anything to 
be different, no forwards, not backwards, not for all eternity. Not just to tolerate 
necessity, still less to conceal it — all idealism is hypocrisy towards necessity —
, but to love it... (EH “Why I am so Clever” 10). 
 
Han-Pile emphasizes that the Nietzschean formula assumes “a transformation, 
not of the past, but of ourselves” (242). Then we may conceive of amor fati as an 
alternative to time machines (and a criticism), i.e., the amor fati formula of 
Nietzsche “represents a human, heteronomous alternative to willing backwards 
(…),” according to Han-Pile (243). 
 
      By associating time machines—in particular travels into the past—with the 
man of ressentiment, it is possible to advocate, as Nietzsche indicated in On the 
Genealogy of Morality, the lineage of modern science, which points toward the priest 
(the archetype or personification of ressentiment, according to Reginster 28 ), a 
representative of the ascetic ideal. For priests, the ascetic ideal means “the actual 
priestly faith, their best instrument of power and also the “ultimate” sanction of 
their power” (GM III 1). Thus science, according to Nietzsche, “is not the 																																																								
28  Cf. Reginster, B. “Nietzsche on ressentiment and valuation.” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 57 (2): 281-305, 1997, p. 289. 
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opposite of the ascetic ideal but rather the latter’s own most recent and noble 
manifestation” (GM III 23), and the time machine fable suggests such a relation.  
 
Final Remarks 
      Closed time-like curves (CTCs), or time machines, are objects within 
Einstein's theory of general relativity. The van Stockum space-time and the Gödel 
cosmological model are examples of solutions of Einstein's field equations that 
possess CTCs. Researches have proposed physical and philosophical arguments 
in order to exclude time machines as physical realities and its inherent paradoxes. 
However, a strong, general, and persuasive argument that rules out time travels, 
especially travels into the past, is missing in physics and philosophy so far. 
Arguments like Hawking's chronology protection conjecture show that 
ingredients beyond general relativity are necessary in order to reject time 
machines. Therefore, this paper presents an ontological argument against time 
machines that comes from the philosophy of becoming. Individuation thought 
of as a non-process, supposedly generated by a metaphysical principle of 
individuation, motivates the belief in human beings who would travel into the 
past. In an exaggerated degree, individuation as non-process gives rise to the 
belief in human beings conceived of as isolated beings, as something separated 
from their contexts and milieus. However, an individual emerges from a society, 
culture with values and language, and from a specific historical time. The belief 
in the complete individuation ignores such a condition, and one dreams with 
humans as “free particles” traveling into the past. Then, by using Simondon's 
process of individuation, Heraclitus' river image, in which “everything is in flux,” 
and Nietzsche's “radical rejection of the very concept of 'being',” time machines 
appear as subject of science fiction, and CTCs become non-physical objects of 
Einstein's theory of gravity. Lastly, I proposed a psychological origin for the time 
machine fable. The modern ressentiment gives rise to the time travel fable, in which 
a hypothetical and optimistic time traveler would correct all historical events. 
Then, the amor fati formula of Nietzsche is a response to the resentful time 
traveler.        
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